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Abstract
This work builds on the model in Goldstein and Pauzner (GP)
(2005), a global-games version of the Diamond-Dybvig (DD) (1983)
model in which there is uncertainty about the long-term return and
in which agents observe noisy signals about that return. GP limited
their investigation to a banking contract that makes a noncontingent
promised payo¤to those who withdraw early until the banks resources
are exhausted. We amend the contract and permit suspension. As we
show, there is a class of suspension policies that gives rise to uniqueness
without requiring the new assumption introduced in a proof in GP;
namely, the short-term return is also random. In general, both the
GP policy and my generalization of it to allow suspension seem not
to be the best banking contracts. However, if the return uncertainty
is su¢ ciently small, then there are policies in the class we study that
imply ex ante welfare close to the rst-best outcome in DD, which itself
is an upper bound on welfare in the model with return uncertainty.
1 Introduction
This papers builds on the model in Goldstein and Pauzner (GP) (2005), a
global-games version of the Diamond-Dybvig (DD) (1983) model in which
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there is uncertainty about the long-term return and in which agents observe
noisy signals about that return.
GP limited their investigation to a banking contract that makes a non-
contingent promised payo¤ to those who withdraw early until the banks
resources are exhausted. Here, that contract is amended to permit suspen-
sion. There are two reasons for this. First, suspension works perfectly in
the no aggregate-risk version of the DD model. (It uniquely implements
the rst-best outcome.) Because versions of GP are close to that model,
it is plausible that suspension would also work well in such versions. Sec-
ond, as shown below, there is a class of suspension policies that gives rise to
uniqueness without requiring the new assumption introduced in a proof in
GP namely, that the short-term return is also random.
In general, both the GP policy and the generalization of it that allows
suspension seem not to be the best banking contracts in a model with return
uncertainty and signals about it. Viewed as mechanisms, such contracts
make no attempt to elicit information about the signals that agents receive
and to make suspension and payo¤s to at least some depositors contingent
on that information. However, if the return uncertainty is su¢ ciently small,
then there are policies in the class I study that imply ex ante welfare close to
the rst-best outcome in DD, which itself is an upper bound on the welfare
in the model with return uncertainty. Moreover, for one such policy, noisy
signals are not necessary for uniqueness. In other words, the ex ante welfare
properties of the DD suspension policy are robust to the kind of uncertainty
introduced by GP, provided it is small.
The virtue of such uncertainty is that in a long sequence of i.i.d. realiza-
tions of the model, all of the following four outcomes occur with positive prob-
ability: fgood long  term return; poor long  term returng fsuspension
not invoked; suspension invokedg. Put di¤erently, the model with a small
amount of GP uncertainty combined with a banking contract that permits
suspension gives a unique equilibrium, does well in terms of ex ante welfare,
and is able to account for a rich history of banking-system outcomes, includ-
ing ones with a variety of banking-system di¢ culties di¢ culties that are
rare, but do occur.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set out
in Section 2. Section 3 has the uniqueness results. Section 4 deals with ex
ante welfare. Section 5 contains the proofs, while section 6 o¤ers concluding
remarks.
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2 Model
Our model is essentially GP, but without uncertainty about the short-term
return. There are three dates, one good and a nonatomic unit measure of
agents. Each agent is endowed with 1 unit of good at date 0. The agent
becomes impatient with probability  and the agent becomes patient with
probability 1 . Impatient agents can consume only at date 1. They derive
utility u(c1) from date 1 consumption c1. Patient agents can consume at both
date 1 and date 2. They derive utility u(c1 + c2) from consumption bundle
(c1; c2). Type is i.i.d. across agents and there is no aggregate uncertainty
about type. The function u(:) satises the following properties: it is twice
continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, strictly concave, and satises u(0) =
0, u0(0) =1, and  cu00(c)=u0(c) > 11.
A risky production technology is available to everyone. One unit of date-
0 investment yields R > 1 units of date-2 output with probability p() and
0 with probability 1   p(), where , labeled the fundamental, is uniformly
distributed over [0; 1] and p : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] and is continuous, strictly in-
creasing, and satises p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1. If liquidated at date 1, the
investment pays return 1. The technology has a higher long-term return in
the sense that E(p())u(R) > u(1).
Figure 1 shows two examples of possible p() functions. Limiting cases
of each, indicated by the arrows, serves di¤erent purposes later.
Figure 1: p()
1Although these assumptions, taken together, rule out CARA, they are innocuous in
general.
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The fundamental , which is not observed, determines a private signal
received by each agent. The private signal is 0 = + "0, where "0 is indepen-
dently and uniformly distributed over [ "; "]. It follows that given signal 0,
 is uniformly distributed over [max(0; 0   ");min(1; 0 + ")]2.
The timeline is as follows. At date 0, the bank o¤ers a deposit contract
(x; ) 2 [1;+1)  [; 1] with x  1. It gives each agent who is able to
withdraw at date 1 x units of output per unit of deposit, while allowing no
more than  proportion of the agents to withdraw at date 1. For the moment,
I assume that agents deposit in the bank and that all available resources are
invested3.
Just prior to date 1, the fundamental, the agent types and their signals
are realized. Then agents simultaneously choose between withdraw and wait.
The date-1 payo¤ from playing withdraw is
c1 =

x with probability =max(; n)
0 with probability 1  =max(; n) ;
where n is the proportion who choose to withdraw. At date 2, the long-term
return is realized. Each agent who played wait and each agent who played
withdraw but received 0 at date 1 get the date 2 payo¤
c2 =

R[1  xmin(; n)]=[1 min(; n)] if R is realized
0 otherwise
:
Because each impatient agent necessarily plays withdraw, it is su¢ cient
to focus on the play of the patient. I focus on symmetric strategies and allow
randomization. Thus, a strategy is y : [ "; 1 + "]! [0; 1], where y(0) is the
probability that a patient agent with signal 0 plays withdraw. The solution
concept is Nash equilibrium.
Denition 1 The function y is a symmetric equilibrium if it is a best re-
sponse to the play of y by all other agents.
Following the Global Games literature, a threshold equilibrium plays an
important role in what follows.
2Agents utilize the information  2 [0; 1].
3There exists a contract that is consistent with a unique equilibrium and under which
agents want to deposit rather than remain in autarky.
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Denition 2 The function y is a threshold equilibrium if there exists b such
that y(0) = 1 for 0 < b and y(0) = 0 for 0 > b.
In what follows, I distinguish between two kinds of threshold equilibrium.
Following most of the literature, I reserve the term run for a threshold equi-
librium in which b  1 + " and in which, therefore, y()  1. Any other
threshold equilibrium is called interior.
I suspect that condition 1 can be relaxed so that equilibrium b 2 [ "; "][
[1  "; 1+ "] exists. But the probability of a run of such equilibrium is either
" or 1  " and " is assumed to be negligible.
3 Conditions for uniqueness and for multi-
plicity
Before discussing about uniquenss, conditions on (x; ) are established so
that an interior threshold equilibrium exists:
Proposition 1 (Existence of threshold) If (x; ) satises
0 <
Z 

[u(
1  xn
1  n R)  u(x)]dn
+
Z 1

[u(
1  x
1   R)  u(x)]

n
dn, (1)
there exists e", which can depend on (x; ), such that if " 2 (0;e"], then an
interior equilibrium with cut-o¤ value b 2 ["; 1  "] exists.
In fact, condition (1) is also a necessary condition on (x; ) for the exis-
tence of such equilibrium. I next turn to uniqueness. Several properties are
necessary for Global Games uniqueness to hold in this model. The somewhat
problematic property is an interval of the fundamental for which wait is a
dominant strategy. GP get this interval by making the short-term return de-
pend on the fundamental as follows: they assume that there exists ^ 2 (0; 1)
such that if   ^, then the date 1 return is R. I get this property from
suspension contracts that reserve su¢ cient resources for date 2 payo¤s.
Let
A = f(x; )j(1  x)R
1   > xg, (2)
which is displayed in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Set A
If the returnR is realized, then the date-2 payo¤is no less than (1 x)R=(1 
). Therefore, if the contract is in set A, then choosing wait is a dominant
strategy for an agent who realizes a su¢ ciently high signal. This is su¢ cient
to assure that the Global Games uniqueness result holds.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness) Let (x; ) 2 A. There exists ", which can
depend on (x; ), such that if " 2 (0; "], then there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium and it is an interior threshold equilibrium.
To avoid the dependence of " on (x; ) (in fact, "! 0 as (x; ) approaches
the upper boundary of A), I can restrict contracts to a slightly smaller set.
Corollary 1 (" independent of (x; )) For any k 2 (0; R  1), let
Ak = f(x; )j1  x
1   R > x+ kg. (3)
There exists "k > 0 such that for any (x; ) 2 Ak, if " 2 (0; "k], then there is
a unique equilibrium and it is an interior threshold equilibrium.
Contracts within A give rise to a unique equilibrium. Outside of A, the
model always has a run equilibrium.
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Proposition 3 (Existence of run) If (x; ) =2 A, then a run equilibrium
(y(0)  1) exists.
In general, I am not sure about uniqueness outside of set A. However, if
(x; ) is near the upper boundary of A, then condition (1) is satised. That
and Proposition 3 together imply multiplicity.
Corollary 2 (Existence of multiple equilibrium) If x > 1,  >  and
(x; ) 62 A but near A, then multiple equilibria exist for a su¢ ciently small
" > 0.
Contracts in A with  =  have a unique equilibrium even without noise;
namely, even if " = 0. All other contracts in A require noise for uniqueness.
Proposition 4 (Necessity of noise) Suppose " = 0. If (x; ) 2 A and
 > , then multiple equilibria exist.
4 Optimality
Although contracts inA have a unique equilibrium, in general, our contracts
and, hence, the GP contracts seem not to be the best implementable arrange-
ments. They preclude giving almost everyone some date 1 payo¤when signals
imply that 0 is a very likely date 2 return. In particular, our contract does
not permit the bank to elicit information about the signals from agents and
to make the suspension parameter and the date-1 payo¤ of at least some
agents contingent on such information. Despite that, a bit can be said about
ex ante (representative-agent) welfare under our class of contracts.
Contracts in A with  =  always have a unique equilibrium and it is
tempting to focus on such contracts. The rst result says that limiting the
contracts further to those with  =  can be costly.
Proposition 5 (Desirability of  > ) There exist economies (p(:); R) for
which the best contract in A has  > .
As shown in the proof, one way to get such economies is by using a
limiting case of the p() function depicted by the solid curve in Figure 1. For
such p() functions, the optimal contract within set A has  >  and, by way
of proposition 4, has a unique equilibrium only in the presence of noise.
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The economies in the last proposition have a lot of uncertainty and, there-
fore, are ones for which the gain from enriching the class of contracts is pre-
sumably large. If I interpret the DD model to have p()  1, then they are
also economies that are far from the DD economy. In such economies, there
seems to be a big gain from eliciting information from agents. I next turn to
economies where such gain could be negligible. These economies are close to
the DD economy in the sense that they have p() functions that are close to
p()  1 (see the dotted p() function in Figure 1). Note that DD rst-best
welfare is an upper bound on ex ante welfare in our environment. The next
result says that for economies close to DD in that sense, our contract has ex
ante welfare close to that upper bound and, hence, is close to being ex ante
optimal.
Let x be the rst-best date-1 consumption in DD. The assumption
 cu00(c)=u0(c) > 1 implies that (1   x)R=(1   )   x > 0. Hence, there
exists k 2 (0; (1   x)R=(1   )   x). Consider a sequence of economies
fpl(:), "lg1l=1 such that liml!1 pl() = 1 for  > 0 and liml!1 "l ! 0, where
"l satises Corollary 1 for the function pl().
Proposition 6 (Perturbation of DD) Let k 2 (0; (1   x)R=(1   )  
x). For any (x; ) 2 Ak (see (3)), the limit of ex ante welfare is the rst-best
welfare in DD.
Note that Ak contains the DD suspension contract (x; ). Under this
contract, I obtain uniqueness even if there is no noise even if agents observe
the fundamental directly. It follows that the DD suspension contract is robust
to the introduction of a small amount of date-2 return uncertainty without
the introduction of noisy signals.
5 Proofs
Before presenting the proofs, it is helpful to introduce additional notation
and some preliminary lemmas. Lemmas 1-2 show that (x; ) gives rise to the
properties necessary for the Global Games results to hold in our environment.
Lemma 3 applies the GP Global Games technique.
Following the Global Games literature, I consider a threshold strategy,
denoted by its cut-o¤ value b. At a threshold equilibrium, the proportion of
agents who choose to withdraw depends on the fundamental and the cut-o¤
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value. The function of withdrawal is:
n(;b) =
8><>:
1 if   b   "
 if  > b + "
1  1 
2"
(   b + ") if otherwise . (4)
Suppose the proportion of agents who choose withdraw is n and the fun-
damental is . If an agent plays wait, she receives expected utility u([1  
xmin(; n)]=[1 min(; n)]R)p(). If she plays withdraw, she receives x units
of good at date 1 with probability =max(; n); otherwise she has to wait
and withdraw at date 2. The function of the expected gain from choosing
wait conditional on  is
v(; n; x; ) = fu[1  xmin(; n)
1 min(; n) R]p()  u(x)g

max(; n)
: (5)
The conditional distribution of , given 0 2 ["; 1   "], is uniform over [0  
"; 0+"], and thus the function of the conditional expected gain from playing
wait is
U(0;b; x; ) = 1
2"
Z 0+"
0 "
v(; n(;b); x; )d. (6)
Global Games literature often makes use of monotonicity. But the func-
tion v(; n(;b); x; ) here is not increasing in . Lemma 1 shows that this
function crosses the horizontal axis at most once, and this is enough for
uniqueness. Lemma 1 also gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for b to
be a threshold equilibrium.
Lemma 1 For any threshold b, v(; n(;b); x; ) satises the single crossing
property: there exists at most one  such that v(; n(;b); x; ) = 0.
U(b;b; x; ) is strictly increasing and continuous in b 2 ["; 1  "].
If b 2 ["; 1  "] satisies U(b;b; x; ) = 0, then b is a threshold equilibrium.
Proof. For any threshold strategy b, n(;b) is decreasing in  and p is
strictly increasing in . Therefore
u[
1  xmin(; n(;b))
1 min(; n(;b)) R]p()  u(x) (7)
is strictly increasing in  and is equal to 0 for at most one . Then v(; n(;b); x; )
is equal to 0 for at most one .
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U(b;b; x; ) is is strictly increasing in b 2 ["; 1   "], because when both
the private signal and the threshold strategy increase by the same amount,
an agents belief about how many other agents withdraw is unchanged, but
the return from waiting is higher.
U(b;b; x; ) = 0 implies that v(; n(;b); x; ) crosses zero at most once.
Observing signal 0 below b shifts the probability from positive values of v
to negative values. Thus U(0;b; x; ) < U(b;b; x; ) = 0. Similarly, 0 aboveb imply U(0;b; x; ) > U(b;b; x; ) = 0.
With the strict monotonicity of (7), it is not hard to see that v(; n(;b); x; )
is equal to zero at most once. Also a higher signal 0 shifts the integral of
U to the right. Thus U(b;b; x; ) = 0 is enough to ensure that b is an equi-
librium. Then the only task is to guarantee the existence of such b. Lemma
2 provides a su¢ cient condition for that, under which wait is the dominant
action for a large 0. I obtain such property as a natural result of incorpo-
rating suspension into their contracts, while [4] assumes that the short-run
return is also high with positive probability.
Lemma 2 Dene  : A! [0; 1] and  : A! [0; 1]:
(x; ) = p 1(
u(x)
u(1 x
1  R)
) (8)
(x; ) = p 1(
u(x)
u(1 x
1  R)
), (9)
Let (x; ) 2 A. The function U has two dominance intervals: if 0 > (x; )+
", then wait is the dominant action; If 0 < (x; )  ", then withdraw is the
dominant action.
Proof. Note that 1 x
1  R > x; then  and  are well-dened. If 
0 < (x; ) ",
then the fundamental  < (x; ). Note that u[1 xn
1 n R]p()   u(x) is strictly
decreasing in n and strictly increasing in . Then we have
u[
1  xmin(; n)
1 min(; n) R]p()  u(x)
< u[
1  x
1   R]p()  u(x) = 0, (10)
which implies v(; n; x; ) < 0 independent of n 2 [; 1]. Hence if 0 
(x; )   ", wait is the dominant action. The rest of the lemma follows
similarly.
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Contracts in Set A reserve enough resources for future withdrawals even
when the others choose withdraw. Hence the upper dominance interval is
obtained. Then equilibrium b can found by the intermediate value theorem.
In fact, the restriction on set A is strong so that b is the unique equilib-
rium. Lemma 3 applies the GP technique and precludes other equilibrium
possibilities.
Lemma 3 Let (x; ) 2 A. If " 2 (0; "(x; )] with
"(x; ) = minf(1  (x; ))=3; (x; )=3; 1=4g, (11)
then any equilibrium is a threshold equilibrium.
Proof. Note that (x; ), (x; ) 2 (0; 1); then, "(x; ) > 0 and (0; "(x; )] is
well-dened. Suppose by contradiction that y is a non-threshold equilibrium.
Since y is xed throughout this proof, it is helpful to suppress the dependence
of U and n on strategy y. Let U(0; x; ) be the function of expected gain
from wait and contract (x; ). Let n() be the proportion of those who choose
withdraw.  denotes the fundamental and 0 is the private signal.
Dene
0B = supf0 : U(0; x; ) < 0g: (12)
By Lemma 2, [ "; (x; )   "]  f0 : U(0; x; ) < 0g and hence 0B is well-
dened. Furthermore, [(x; ) + "; 1 + "] \ f0 : U(0; x; ) < 0g = ;, which
implies 0B  (x; ) + "  1  2".
Dene
0A = supf0 < 0B : U(0; x; ) > 0g. (13)
Since y is not a threshold equilibrium, there must exist 0 < 0B such that
U(0; x; ) > 0, and then 0A is well dened. By Lemma 2, [(x; ) + "; 1 +
"] \ f0 < 0B : U(0; x; ) > 0g = ; and hence 0A  (x; )  "  2".
Continuity of U implies
U(0A; x; ) = U(
0
B; x; ) = 0. (14)
Conditional on signal 0A, which belongs to [2"; 1   2"], the fundamental
 is uniformly distributed over [0A   "; 0A + "]. Similarly, conditional on
0B,  is uniform over [
0
B   "; 0B + "]. Dene 01 = maxf0B   "; 0A + "g,  
01 = minf0B  "; 0A+ "g,
  
02 = 
0
A  " and 02 = 0B + ". Then [0A  "; 0A+ "]
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and [0B   "; 0B + "] can be decomposed into three intervals: [01;
  
01 ], [
0
1; 
0
2]
and [
  
02 ;
  
01 ]. Dene the mirror image transformation,
  
 :[01; 
0
2]! [
  
02 ;
  
01 ]:
  
 = 0A + 
0
B   . (15)
Then (14) impliesZ 02
01
v(; n(); x; )d =
Z 02
01
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )d4. (16)
In what follows, I only consider the situation with 0B   0A 2 ("; 2").
However the proof can be generalized without di¢ culty.
Figure 3
Let (n) be the inverse of the restriction of n() to [01; 
0
2]. Dene the
"inverse" of n(
  
 ):
 !
 (n) = inff : n(   ) < n or  = 02g. The following
claim provides the properties of these functions.
Claim 1 n() decreases over [01; 
0
2] at the rate of (1 )=2"; n() increases
over [
  
02 ;
  
01 ] at a rate less than (1 )=2"; For any 0 2 [
  
01 ; 
0
1], n(
0)  n(01);
n(02)  n(
  
02)  n(01); For all 0 2 [01; 02],
  
0 < 01 and n(
  
0 )  n(  02); (n)
is strictly decreasing; n(
     !
 (n)) = n;
 !
 (n) is strictly decreasing.
Proof of Claim 1. (12) and (13) imply that U(0; x; ) < 0 for 0 2
(0A; 
0
B) and that U(
0; x; ) > 0 for 0 > 0B. As the fundamental  in-
creases from 01 to 
0
2, patient agents who observe signals 
0 2 [01 + "; 02 + "]
4I suppress the dependence of n on strategy y in function n(:; :).
12
gradually replace patient agents who observe signals 0 2 [0A; 0B]. Hence
n(:) decreases in [01; 
0
2] at the rate of (1   )=2". Note that the sign of
U(0; x; ) in [0A  "; 0A] is undetermined, as indicated in Figure 3. Then, as
the fundamental  decreases from
  
01 to
  
02 , patient agents who observe signals
0 2 [0A; 0B] and who thus choose withdraw, are gradually replaced by patient
agents who observe [0A  "; 0A] and who may or may not choose wait. Hence
n(:) increases in [
  
02 ;
  
01 ] at a rate less than (1   )=2". As  moves from  
01 to 
0
1, patient agents, who observe signals 
0 2 [  01   "; 0A] and who thus
may or may not choose wait, are gradually replaced by patient agents who ob-
serve [0B; 
0
1 + "] and choose wait. Then for any 
0 2 [  01 ; 01], n(0)  n(01).
Suppose by contradiction n(
  
02) > n(
0
1); then, I have n(
0) > n(01) for all
0 2 [  02 ;
  
01 ], and hence (16) does not hold, a contradiction. Because n() is
strictly decreasing in [01; 
0
2], (n) is strictly decreasing. Note that n(
  
 ) is
decreasing in [01; 
0
2]. Then,
 !
 (n) is strictly decreasing by its denition.
The LHS of (16) can be rewritten asZ 02
01
v(; n(); x; )d =
Z n(  02)
n(01)
v((n); n; x; )d(n)
+
Z n(02)
n(
  
02)
v((n); n; x; )d(n). (17)
Because
     !
 (n)  01 < (n) for all n 2 [n(
  
02); n(
0
1)) and v(; n; x; ) is
strictly increasing in , I haveZ n(  02)
n(01)
v((n); n; x; )d(n) >
Z n(  02)
n(01)
v(
     !
 (n); n; x; )d(n). (18)
The RHS of (16) can be rewritten asZ 02
01
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )d
=
Z  ! (n(01))
01
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )d +
Z 02
 !
 (n(01))
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )A()d
+
Z 02
 !
 (n(01))
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )(1  A())d, (19)
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where
A() =
(
1 if @n(
  
 )
@
9 and < 0
0 otherwise
. (20)
If
 !
 (n) is di¤erentiable with @
 !
 (n)
@n
< 0 at n, then, by denition of
 !
 (n),
n(
  
 ) is also di¤erentiable with @n(
  
 )
@
< 0 at
 !
 (n). Note that
 !
 (n) is strictly
decreasing and hence is almost everywhere di¤erentiable with @
 !
 (n)
@n
< 0.
Thus I have A(
 !
 (n)) = 1 almost everywhere. Then the second integral in
(19) becomes Z 02
 !
 (n(01))
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )A()d
=
Z n(  02)
n(01)
v(
     !
 (n); n; x; )A(
 !
 (n))d[
 !
 (n)  (n)]
+
Z n(  02)
n(01)
v(
     !
 (n); n; x; )d(n). (21)
Combining (18), (17), (19), and (21), I haveZ n(02)
n(
  
02)
v((n); n; x; )d(n) <
Z  ! (n(01))
01
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )d
+
Z n(  02)
n(01)
v(
     !
 (n); n; x; )A(
 !
 (n))d[
 !
 (n)  (n)]
+
Z 02
 !
 (n(01))
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )(1  A())d. (22)
I will reach a contradiction against (22) in what follows.
The integrals on the RHS of (22) have the same length as the integral on
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the LHS of (22):Z  ! (n(01))
01
d +
Z n(  02)
n(01)
A(
 !
 (n))d[
 !
 (n)  (n)] +
Z 02
 !
 (n(01))
(1  A())d
=
Z 02
01
d  
Z 02
 !
 (n(01))
A()d
+
Z n(  02)
n(01)
A(
 !
 (n))d
 !
 (n) 
Z n(  02)
n(01)
A(
 !
 (n))d(n)
=
Z 02
01
d  
Z n(  02)
n(01)
A(
 !
 (n))d(n)
=
Z n(02)
n(
  
02)
d(n). (23)
Integration by substitution and
 !
 (n(
  
02)) = 
0
2 implyZ 02
 !
 (n(1))
A()d =
Z n(  02)
n(1)
A(
 !
 (n))d
 !
 (n),
and hence the second equality of (23).
R 02
01
d =
R n(02)
n(01)
d(n) and A(
 !
 (n)) =
1 almost everywhere imply the third equality of (23).
Because, by claim 1, n(
  
02)  n(02) and (n) is decreasing in n, the
LHS of (22) can be treated as a regular integral with nonnegative weight
on value v((n); n; x; ). Because, by claim 1, n(01)  n(
  
02) and
 !
 (n)  
(n) is decreasing in n, the second integral on the RHS of (22) is a regular
integral with nonnegative weights on value v(
     !
 (n); n; x; ). n(01)  n(
  
02)
implies
 !
 (n(01)) < 
0
2. Hence the third integral on the RHS of (22) is a
regular integral with nonnegative weight on value v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; ). A similar
statement holds for the rst integral. Therefore, the weights on the value of
v on both sides of (22) are nonnegative.
The rest of the argument is divided into two cases: v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; ) 
0 and v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; ) < 0. Suppose v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; )  0. Be-
cause v(; n; x; ) is strictly increasing in  and strictly decreasing in n when
v(; n; x; )  0, we have condition 1: v((n); n; x; ) > v((n(  02)); n(
  
02); x; )
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for all n 2 [n(02); n(
  
02))
5. In other words, the function v within the integral
on the LHS of (22) is bounded below by v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; ).
Note that
  
0 < 01 < (n) and n(
  
0 )  n(  02) for all 0 2 [01; 02] and
n 2 (n(02); n(01)]. Therefore we have condition 2: v(
  
0 ; n(
  
0 ); x; ) <
v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; ) for 
0 2 [01; 02), and v(
     !
 (n); n; x; ) < v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; )
for n 2 (n(  02); n(01)]. The function v within the integral on the RHS of (22)
is bounded above by v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; ).
Then conditions 1-2 implyZ n(02)
n(
  
02)
v((n); n; x; )d(n)
> v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; )
Z n(02)
n(
  
02)
d(n)
= v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; )f
Z  ! (n(01))
01
d
+
Z n(  02)
n(01)
A(
 !
 (n))d[
 !
 (n)  (n)]
+
Z 02
 !
 (n(01))
(1  A())dg
>
Z  ! (n(01))
01
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )d
+
Z n(  02)
n(01)
v(
     !
 (n); n; x; )A(
 !
 (n))d[
 !
 (n)  (n)]
+
Z 02
 !
 (n(01))
v(
  
 ; n(
  
 ); x; )(1  A())d, (24)
which contradicts (22).
5If n(
  
02) = n(
0
2), both sides of inequality (22) are equal to zero, a contradiction.
Therefore n(
  
02) > n(
0
2), which implies that [n(
0
2); n(
  
02)) is well-dened.
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Suppose v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; ) < 0, which implies
u[
1  xmin(; n(  02))
1 min(; n(  02))
R]p((n(
  
02)))  u(x) < 0.
Because
  
0 < 01 < (n) and n(
  
0 )  n(  02) for all 0 2 [01; 02] and n 2
(n(02); n(
0
1)], I have
u[
1  xmin(; n(  0 ))
1 min(; n(  0 ))
R]p(
  
0 )  u(x)
< u[
1  xmin(; n(  02))
1 min(; n(  02))
R]p((n(
  
02)))  u(x),
which implies v(
  
0 ; n(
  
0 ); x; ) < 0 for 0 2 [01; 02] and hence v(
     !
 (n); n; x; ) <
0 for n 2 [n(  02); n(01)]. Then the RHS of (22) is strictly negative, which im-
plies Z n(02)
n(
  
02)
v((n); n; x; )d(n) < 0: (25)
Also, v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; ) < 0 impliesZ n(  02)
n(01)
v((n); n; x; )d(n) < 0: (26)
If
  
01  01, by claim 1, I have for  2 [
  
01 ; 
0
1], n()  n(01)  n(
  
02) and
 < (n(
  
02)), which impliesZ
c
v(; n(); x; )d 
Z
c
v((n(
  
02)); n(
  
02); x; )d  0. (27)
17
If
  
01 > 
0
1, (27) also holds. Then (25), (26) and (27) imply
U(B; x; )
=
Z
c
v(; n(); x; )d
+
Z n(  02)
n(01)
v((n); n; x; )d(n)
+
Z n(02)
n(
  
02)
v((n); n; x; )d(n)
< 0, (28)
which contradicts (14).
Lemma 3 gives an upper bound on " so that only threshold equilibria
exist. The following proof nds a di¤erent upper bound so that in a set (see
(1)) larger than A, there exists a threshold equilibrium. Both conclusions
hold for a common " interval.
Proof of Prop 1. Since p is continuous at 1, e" can be found so that if
" 2 (0;e"], the following is satised:
0 <
Z 

fu[1  xn
1  n R]p(1  2")  u(x)gdn
+
Z 1

fu[1  x
1   R]p(1  2")  u(x)g

n
dn. (29)
It is not hard to see
U(b;b; x; ) = 1
2"
Z +"
 "
v(; n(; ); x; )d
=
Z 

fu[1  xn
1  n R]p((n))  u(x)gdn
+
Z 1

fu[1  x
1   R]p((n))  u(x)g

n
dn
>
Z 

fu[1  xn
1  n R]p(
b   ")  u(x)gdn
+
Z 1

fu[1  x
1   R]p(
b   ")  u(x)g 
n
dn, (30)
18
where (n) is the inverse of the restriction of n(:) to [b   ";b + "]. Then, I
have U(1   "; 1   "; x; ) > 0, combining (29) and the inequality in (30). I
consider a contract with x  1. Then U("; "; x; ) < 0 for a su¢ ciently small
". Then, intermediate value theorem implies the existence of b 2 ["; 1  "] so
that U(b;b; x; ) = 0. Then by lemma 1, b is an equilibrium.
For a su¢ ciently large 0, the above proof only makes sure that wait is
the best response when half of the impatient agents choose withdraw, while
wait is the dominant action in the Proof of Prop 2. This is consistent with
the fact that (1) is less restrictive than Set A.
Proof of Prop 2. By lemma 2, U(b;b; x; ) > 0 if b = (x; ) + ";
U(b;b; x; ) < 0 if b = (x; )   ". By lemma 1, U(b;b; x; ) is continuous
and strictly increasing in b 2 ["; 1  "]. Let " satisfy (11) and thus [(x; ) 
"; (x; )+"] is a subset of ["; 1 "]. Then, by the intermediate value theorem,
there exists a unique b 2 [(x; )  "; (x; ) + "] such that U(b;b; x; ) = 0.
Lemma 1 implies that b is a threshold equilibrium. The model does not have
other threshold equilibria because b such that U(b;b; x; ) = 0 is unique.
Lemma 3 implies that there are no other types of equilibrium.
In the above, " approaches 0 as (x; ) approaches the upper boundary of
A. When I x the contract (x; ) and consider perturbation on the model
parameters including ", it will be convenient to have " independent of (x; ).
Corollary 1 serves this purpose. It nds a uniform bound by keeping (x; )
away from the upper boundary.
Proof of Coro 1. Let  and  satisfy (8) and (9); then, we have
(x; )  p 1( u(x)
u(1 x
1  R)
)  p 1( u(1)
u(R)
) > 0 (31)
(x; )  p 1( u(x)
u(1 x
1  R)
)  p 1( u(x)
u(x+ k)
)  p 1(u(R  k)
u(R)
) < 1. (32)
The rst inequality of (31) holds because x  1. Because (x; ) 2 Ak, and
hence 1 x
1  R > x+k, the rst inequality of (32) holds. The second inequality
holds because x+ k  R.
Let
"k = minf(1  p 1(
u(R  k)
u(R)
))=3; p 1(
u(1)
u(R)
)=3; 1=4g, (33)
(31)-(33) imply
0 < "k  "(x; ) (34)
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for all (x; ) 2 Ak. By Proposition 2, when 0 < " < "k, any (x; ) 2 Ak gives
rise to uniqueness.
So far, suspensions in A appear important in that they are the only
contracts generating the upper dominance interval. If the upper dominance
interval is eliminated, ignoring signals becomes possible and a run always
occurs in one equilibrium as it appears in [1]. In this sense, contracts outside
of A are vulnerable to run, as shown in the following Proof.
Proof of Prop 3. Consider any (x; ) 62 A so that
1  x
1   R  x. (35)
If y  1 is adopted, then n(; 1 + ")  1 and
v(; n(; 1 + "); x; )  fu[1  x
1   R]p()  u(x)g < 0. (36)
Then wait is the best response to y  1. Thus y  1 is an equilibrium.
The following is another example in the global game literature, where
noisy signal is necessary for uniqueness. Contracts in A with  >  are
vulnerable to run in the sense that all agents could coordinate perfectly to
choose withdraw whenever the signal is outside the upper dominance inter-
val. In this case, coordination failure leads to e¢ ciency loss (note that the
inequality in (37) still holds for  less than but su¢ ciently close to  ).
Proof of Prop 4. Note that v(1; 1; x; ) > 0 and v(0; 1; x; ) < 0. By the
intermediate value theorem, there exists  2 (0; 1) so that v(; 1; x; ) = 0.
Similarly,  2 (0; 1) exists so that v(; ; x; ) = 0.
 >  implies
0 = v(; ; x; ) = v(; 1; x; ) < v(; ; x; ), (37)
where the inequality holds because v(; n; x; ) is strictly decreasing in n
when it is nonnegative. (37) implies  < . Hence (; ) is nonempty. For
any  2 (; ),
v(; 1; x; ) < v(; 1; x; ) = 0 = v(; ; x; ) < v(; ; x; ), (38)
where the inequalities hold because v(; n; x; ) is strictly increasing in .
For signal  2 (; ), if other patient agents play wait, it is the best
response for each patient agent to play wait. There exists an equilibrium y
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such that y() = 0 for any  2 (; ). Similarly, there exists an equilibrium
y0 such that y0() = 1 for any  2 (; ).
 >  allows the payo¤ to depend on othersactions. Hence a run can
occur as a result of coordination on the perfect signal. One way to eliminate
such a channel is to set  = . The following constructs an example where
setting  =  is too restrictive. A run is desirable only if the long-run
return turns out to be low. Such an event occurs with high probability in
the following example. Hence  =  will eliminate a desirable run with high
probability.
Proof of Prop 5. It does no harm to assume that R is su¢ ciently big that
[Ru(1)]=u(R) > 1. Construct a sequence fpl(:)g such that E(pl())u(R) >
u(x), liml!1 pl() = 1 if   1  u(1)u(R) , and liml!1 pl() = 0 otherwise6.
If the fundamental is  < p 1l (
u(1)
u(R)
)   2", then all agents observe signals
0 < p 1l (
u(1)
u(R)
)  " and know  < p 1l ( u(1)u(R)). They choose withdraw because
u(
1  x
1   R)pl() <
u(1)
u(R)
u(
1  x
1   R)  u(x), (39)
where the second inequality holds because x  1 and hence 1 x
1  R < R.
Therefore, withdraw is the best response for all agents under any (x; ) 2 A.
If   1  u(1)
u(R)
+2", all agents observe signals 0  1  u(1)
u(R)
+ " and know
that the fundamental   1  u(1)
u(R)
. Let k 2 (0; R   1). There exists l such
that if l > l, (40) holds for any (x; ) 2 Ak. In other words, under any
(x; ) 2 Ak, they choose wait when the fundamental is   1  u(1)u(R) + 2".
u(
1  x
1   R)pl() > u(x) (40)
6Such a sequence exists if pl converges to 1 when   1  u(1)u(R) faster than it does to 0
when  < 1  u(1)u(R) so that pl is productive in the long-run for all l.
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For any (x; ) 2 A, if the above strategy is assumed, then
lim
l!1;"!0
j
Z 1
1  u(1)
u(R)
+2"
fu(x) + (1  )u(1  x
1   R)pl()gd
+
Z 1  u(1)
u(R)
+2"
p 1l (
u(1)
u(R)
) 2"
fmin(n; )u(x)
+[1 min(n; )  max(0; 1  
n
)]u(
1  x
1   R)pl()gd
+
Z p 1l ( u(1)u(R) ) 2"
0
fu(x) + (1  )(1  )u(1  x
1   R)pl()gd
 [u(x) + (1  )u(1  x
1   R)]
u(1)
u(R)
 u(x)(1  u(1)
u(R)
)j
= lim
l!1;"!0
j   2"u(x) + u(x)[p 1l (
u(1)
u(R)
)  2"  (1  u(1)
u(R)
)]
(1  )u(1  x
1   R)[
Z 1
1  u(1)
u(R)
+2"
pl()d   u(1)
u(R)
]
(1  )(1  )u(1  x
1   R)
Z p 1l ( u(1)u(R) ) 2"
0
pl()d
+
Z 1  u(1)
u(R)
+2"
p 1l (
u(1)
u(R)
) 2"
fmin(n; )u(x)
+[1 min(n; )  max(0; 1  
n
)]u(
1  x
1   R)pl()gdj
= 0, (41)
where the convergence is uniform7.
Consider any contract (x; ) 2 AnAk When the fundamental is   1  
u(1)
u(R)
+ 2", wait may or may not be the best response for all agents. However
the above welfare of (x; ), assuming that all agents choose wait, is an upper
7For 8 > 0, there exist l > 0& " > 0 that are independent of (x; ) such that if
l > l and " 2 (0; "), then the di¤erence between the welfare of (x; ) and its limit is less
than  for all (x; ) 2 A.
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bound on the equilibrium welfare. The partial derivative of the limiting
welfare with respect to x at (R=(1  + R); ) is
u0(R=(1  + R))  u0(R=(1  + R))Ru(1)
u(R)
< 0. (42)
For a su¢ ciently small k, (x; ) is close to (R=(1 +R); ), and hence (42)
approximates the partial derivative at (x; ). Then, there exist (x; ) 2 Ak
and  > 0 so that the di¤erence between the limiting welfares of (x; ) and
(x0; ) is greater than  for all (x0; ) 2 AnAk. Given the convergence in
(41), there exist l0 > 0 and "0 > 0 so that if l > l0 and "0 > " > 0, the
welfare of (x; ) is strictly higher than that of any (x0; ) 2 AnAk. Note that
(x; ) 2 Ak has the best response consistant with the rst equality of (41),
and the welfare is achieved in equilibrium.
Consider contracts in Ak. There exist 
0 >  and k0 < k so that (x; 0) 2
Ak0 for any x such that (x; ) 2 Ak. The di¤erence between the limiting
welfares of (x; 0) and (x; ) is greater than (0   )u(1)[1   u(1)=u(R)] > 0
by the rst equality of (41). Then, there exist l00 > 0 and "00 > 0 so that if
l > l00 and "00 > " > 0, the welfare of (x; 0) is strictly higher than that of
(x; ) for any x such that (x; ) 2 Ak.
Note that k is chosen arbitrarily. Then for such a k0, there exist l00 so
that when l > l00, (x; 0) has best response consistant with the rst equality
of (41).
Overall, when l is su¢ ciently large and " > 0 is su¢ ciently small, for each
(x; ) 2 A, there is a contract in A with suspension parameter 0 that has a
higher welfare than (x; ) in equilibrium.
The above proof constructs an example by letting the p-curve approach
the horizontal axis in Figure 1. The following lets the curve approach the
horizontal line p  1. The production technology is a version of DD technol-
ogy with small uncertainty and noisy signals. The equilibrium approaches
the DD suspension equilibrium in the sense that the probability of a run
approaches zero.
Proof of Prop 6. For each l, there exists a unique threshold equilibrium
and denote its cut-o¤ value by bl. The proof of proposition 2 implies bl 2
["l ; 1   "l ]. The fundamental  is uniform distributed over [bl   "l ;bl + "l ]
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given the signal bl. Then
0 = lim
l!1
U(bl;bl; x; )
= [ lim
l!1
pl(bl)](Z 

u[
1  xn
1  n R]dn+
Z 1

fu[1  x
1   R]

n
dn)
 
Z 

u(x)dn 
Z 1

u(x)

n
dn, (43)
where integration by substitution implies the second equality of (43). Then
liml!1 pl(bl) exists and belongs to (0; 1), which implies liml!1 bl = 0 because
liml!1 pl() = 1 for all  2 (0; 1]. Also note that liml!1 "l = 0, which
implies
lim
l!+1
Z 1
bl+"l (pl()  1)d = 0. (44)
Then the limiting welfare of (x; ) in the perturbed model is equal to the
rst-best welfare in DD:
lim
l!1
f
Z 1
bl+"l [u(x
) + (1  )u(1  x

1   R)pl()]d
+
Z bl "l
0
[u(x) + (1  )(1  )u(1  x

1   R)pl()]d
+
Z bl+"l
bl "l [

max(n(;bl); )u(x)
+u[
1  xmin(; n(;bl))
1 min(; n(;bl)) R]pl()[(1  )  (n(;
bl)  )
max(n(;bl); ) ]
+u(x)
(n(;bl)  )
max(; n(;bl)) ]dg
 u(x)  (1  )u(1  x

1   R)
= lim
l!1
f
Z 1
bl+"l (1  )u(
1  x
1   R)(pl()  1)dg
= 0. (45)
Because liml!1 bl = 0 and liml!1 "l = 0, the rst equality of (45) holds.
The second equality of (45) follows from (44).
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6 Concluding remarks
Suspension is widely used during nancial crises and has attracted atten-
tion in the literature. This paper introduces another potential role of sus-
pension with respect to Global Games literature. Suspension generates the
upper interval as an endogenous result, while previous studies directly as-
sume such property8. In this paper, by reserving enough resources for future
withdrawals, suspension is su¢ cient for uniqueness without the new GP as-
sumption that appears for the rst time in their proof.
The optimality of suspension in DD is robust to the introduction of a small
amount of uncertainty and a small amount of noise. However in general both
the GP policy and my generalization of it seem not to be optimal. Such
contracts do not attempt to elicit information received by agents and to
condition payo¤s and the suspension parameter on that information. The
potential gain from such an attempt would be substantial, especially when
the model has a lot of return uncertainty. Therefore, extending the contract
to allow for eliciting information would be interesting.
References
[1] Diamond, D. W., and Dybvig, P. H. (1983):" Bank Runs, Deposit Insur-
ance, and Liquidity" Journal of Political Economy
[2] Ennis, H., and Keister, T. (2010): "Bank Runs and Institutions: The
Perils of Intervention" American Economics Review
[3] Ennis, H., and Keister, T. (2010): "Banking Panics and Policy Re-
sponses" Journal of Monetary Economy
[4] Goldstein, I., and Pauzner, A. (2005): " Demand- Deposit Contracts and
the Probability of Bank Runs" Journal of Finance
[5] Green, E.,J., and Lin, P. (2003): " Implementing E¢ cient Mechanisms
in a Model of Financial Intermediation" Journal of Economic Theory
8For the purpose of demonstrating the technique, Morris and Shin (1998) directly
assume that the government defend the target exchange rate when the fundamental is
good.
25
[6] Morris, S., and Shin, H. S. (1998): "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of
Self-Fullling Currency Attacks" American Economic Review
[7] Peck, J., and Shell, K. (2003): "Equilibrium Bank Runs" Journal of
Political Economy
26
